Rola normy prawnej w przekładzie przepisów prawnych by Panek, Grzegorz
INVESTIGATIONES LINGUISTICAE VOL. XVII, 2009 
© INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTICS – ADAM MICKIEWICZ UNIVERSITY 
AL. NIEPODLEGŁOŚCI 4, 60-874, POZNAŃ – POLAND 
75 
 
 
Towards a Norm-Based Approach  
in Translation of Legal Provisions 
Rola normy prawnej w przekładzie  
przepisów prawnych 
Grzegorz Panek 
CHAIR OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FACULTY OF LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, UNIVERSITY OF SILESIA 
KATOWICE, UL BANKOWA 11B 
grzegpanek@o2.pl 
Abstract 
If norms, as understood in the theory of law, are mental representations of 
legal provisions, the latter viewed as a unit of text, one may reach the 
conclusion that equivalent translation of a legal provision is a rendition 
from which identical norms may be mentally inferred. In this paper, we are 
going to show how norms inferred from the source text provision may 
profile the expressions used in the target text. The norm-based approach 
opens up space for cognitive analysis, since it is the competent interpreter’s 
mental semantic matrix that determines the norm, understood as an output 
of interpretation. 
 
1. Introduction – the basic assumption 
Before we move to the relation between the notions of “norm” and “provision,” 
implied in the title of this paper, we shall start with one of the most general 
statements possible when it comes to theory of translation. We are going to invoke 
the thought of one of the founders of Polish modern translation studies, Olgierd 
Wojtasiewicz. In his Wstęp do teorii tłumaczenia, originally published in 1957, the 
author provides us with a definition of translation we could currently call 
cognitive. Quite surprisingly, as emphasized by Tomasz Krzeszowski in the preface 
to the second edition (1992) of the book, nowadays, once the triumphant period of 
transformational-generative grammar is generally considered over, the validity of 
Wojtasiewicz’s book is striking in the light of contemporary cognitive linguistics. 
The scholar defined translation as follows: 
The operation of translation of the text “a” formulated in the 
language “A” into the language “B” consists in formulating the text 
“b” in the language “B,” which text (b) is going to evoke the same 
or very similar associations among its receivers to the associations 
aroused among the receivers of the text “a.” (Wojtasiewicz 
2005:28; translated by G.P.) 
2. What is supposed to be equivalent? 
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As we can see, Wojtasiewicz focuses on the notion of comparable associations 
aroused by the source and target text among their addressees. When it comes to 
the level of purely linguistic analysis, the question of what units of text are to evoke 
the same impressions, associations, the scholar introduces a rather vague concept 
of signal: 
By signal we understand (…) the material side of an expression (H. 
Greniewski’s terminology), in other words the written or spoken 
text. (…) The concept of the assignment of certain signals to certain 
psychological conditions (of the nervous system) in the mind of the 
sender, and the assignment of certain psychological conditions to 
certain signals by the receiver, plays the key role in this respect. 
(Wojtasiewicz 2005:19; translated by G.P.) 
Drawing the reader’s attention to signals, the author does not determine the 
linguistic, or grammatical size, formal dimension of the notion. This idea may 
remind us of Ronald Langacker’s (2000) phonological pole of symbolic structures 
(according to the researcher, every linguistic structure is bipolar, on one hand 
there is the phonological pole, on the other, the semantic one). Technically, we 
could distinguish between the phonological and semantic poles while analyzing 
every symbolic structure of language, be it a short single lexical unit or the whole 
text. 
Teresa Tomaszkiewicz (2002:10-22) puts the emphasis on the level of text and 
draws the attention of translation theorists to the study of comparative textology, 
demonstrating for instance that the Western genre of CV’s (Curriculum Vitae) has 
greatly influenced the textual type we used to call “życiorys.” J. Pieńkos (2003:174-
175) stresses that we never translate one language into another one, but always a 
particular source text into the particular target text. Additionally, he points out 
that a word or expression has a particular pragmatic sense only within its context, 
and that the level of sentence is not enough to describe the context. In order to do 
that, we need to treat the level of text as the primary point of reference, not only 
when it comes to the style, but also the meaning of lexical units plunged in the 
particular text. 
We may agree that remarks as these above are definitely true whenever our aim 
is to render the stylistic or syntactic structure of the source text cross-culturally. 
However, if we want to render lexical units, especially specialized terminology of 
law, we must refer to something more abstract and more general than the text 
itself. We have to exceed parole and venture into the langue, the sphere of 
competence, on the search for sense or meaning of particular expressions. 
Definitely, the systematic interconnections between particular texts in one 
language must be taken into consideration if we are to pinpoint the pragmatic 
sense of a particular term. For Eugen Wüster (1959), the founder of the study of 
terminology, there are four layers of analysis when it comes to defining a particular 
term: ontology, epistemology, designation and discursification. If we are to confine 
our semantic analysis to the level of a particular text or a given textual genre in 
genere, our ability to capture the phenomenon of discursification is at risk. Legal 
terms do not function in isolation within the texts they appear in, their analysis 
cannot be constricted as well to the genre, say, of an obligational agreement. Legal 
terms function within the whole branches or even systems of law with all the 
judicature, jurisprudence, theory and practice of law application behind. In order 
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to capture the sense of particular expressions, we have to venture beyond the text, 
in the conceptual, abstract and mental realm of legal norms. 
Abstaining from the notions of style and syntax, we should consider norms as 
the elements which correspond to the similar associations evoked in the mind of 
the source and target text receivers – the criterion of successful translation 
postulated by Wojtasiewicz. It is a particular norm that will determine the 
grammatical character of target language symbolic units, the equivalence of which 
is going to be examined. If norms are mental reflections of textual provisions of 
law, reflections of directive nature, we might conclude that an equivalent 
translation, from the semantic and pragmatic point of view, is such a rendition of 
the source text from which the same or similar norms may be deduced. 
3. Norm vs. provision 
According to the contemporary theory and philosophy of law, there is no legal 
norm without interpretation. A legal norm, regardless of the ways in which it may 
be internally sub-divided, practically equals provision of law plus the mental 
activity of its interpretation (Nowacki, Tobor 2002:56-82).  
In the light of this initial norm-related statement, we may reach the conclusion 
that term “law” itself is more polysemic than a lay person could initially suppose. 
The name does not denote only a set of legally binding acts of a given country, or 
the set of their texts, setting aside the application of these (Morawski 2005:244). It 
may refer to a single provision of a certain statute, a norm inferred from such a 
provision, or to the whole system of norms, set of provisions. If the latter are 
understood, as in the contemporary jurisprudence (Nowacki, Tobor 2002: 15-18), 
as mere pieces or units of text, not equipped in the abstract, conceptual character 
of a norm, we cannot speak of any material connection between them. As a result, 
rather than speak of systems of legal provisions, one should invoke the term 
“system” predominantly in relation to the mental inventory of norms. The key 
notion of structure, which is a conditio sine qua non of any type of system, can be 
attributed only to sets of norms, mental reflections of the provisions of law. S. 
Wronkowska (2004:244 ff) distinguishes between the binding character of a 
provision (which must be enacted pursuant to valid prerequisite procedures) and 
of a norm (its applicability, the obligation on the part of particular organs to apply 
the rule). In its broadest sense, law is a system of entangled norms shaped in the 
process of legal interpretation (not simple provisions of a statute which stand on 
their own, on paper). Law, in the broadest sense of the word, is a system of norms 
inherent to human mind, even though these are inferred from provisions written 
on paper.  
The relation between norms and provisions may be considered tricky. Most 
certainly we cannot speak of one to one quantitative correspondence between the 
object and effect of interpretation (provision and norm), as one norm may be 
deduced from a number of articles or even a couple of legal acts. On the other 
hand, a single provision, say, an article of a statute, may give rise to a number of 
norms applicable in a particular context. We are going to see more precisely how it 
works shortly. 
As a consequence of the tricky character of a norm of law, the fact that there is 
no strict one to one correspondence between particular norms and certain 
provisions these are inferred from, we are not entitled to state legitimately what 
could seem probable from the point of view of Wojtasiewicz’s grasp of the concept 
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of signal, namely that the provision may be considered a notion similar to 
Langacker’s phonological pole, whereas the norm may be associated with the 
semantic pole of the same phenomenon. Langacker (2000) actually speaks of the 
two poles of certain symbolic structures, and, as we have concluded, norms and 
provisions frequently do not boil down to one symbolic structure expressed in a 
given act. Contrarily, particular norms may stem from the provision the translator 
is currently interested in, but it may also be influenced by constitutional provisions 
or articles of some other binding legal acts. The concept of norm, for all its abstract 
character, makes us expand the textual genre-oriented approach to translation. 
4. Alternative grasp of the concept of norm 
The distinction between the abstract, mental norm and the graphical form of 
a provision conceived as a piece of text is not always sufficiently recognized in the 
study of legal translation. Obviously, it is not going to be as valid for scholars 
preoccupied mainly with textual studies, or answering the question of how the 
same logical functors (Ziembiński 2000: 19-21, 77-92)1 are realized internationally 
in various special languages of law, as to these researchers who investigate the 
semantic or pragmatic meaning of legal lexis. Broadly speaking, the syntax of legal 
provisions may be analyzed in general terms of grammatical structures and 
characteristic trademarks of textual genres, whereas legal lexicon is highly specific, 
idiosyncratic and hermetic, and most importantly, conceptually autonomous in 
relation to the text. While textology helps the linguist disambiguate characteristic 
stylistic and syntactic features of a given genre, say particular types of contracts, 
we cannot escape or avoid any reference to the notion of norm when it comes to 
lexical semantics. The concepts expressed in statutory acts must be perceived from 
the point of view of certain normative schemata, to invoke Langackerian (2000) 
terminology, as from the linguistic perspective, processes of norm-inference may 
be accounted for by means of Langacker’s psychological processes of comparison, 
association, abstraction. These psychological processes reach deeper than the 
context of one particular text. Norms become automated in the mind of a 
competent lawyer (or, analogically, legal translator). Legal terms do not function in 
isolation, and, for another thing, they are usually not static phenomena given once 
and for all. Rather than that, they need to be constantly interpreted and 
reinterpreted along new precedent court decisions or newly introduced legal 
provisions which profile the hermetic conceptual framework of various legal 
institutions (Eskridge 1987:1479 ff). In Polish literature this is a concept adhered 
to by M. Matczak (2008:66 ff). From the point of view of cognitive linguistics, 
concepts encountered in legal norms may be analyzed in terms of dynamic radial 
structures, abstract and mental. 
Ewa Myrczek (2005), primarily interested in the grammatical and textual 
instantiation of logical functors in statutory texts, provides a rather neutral 
definition of norm, without the focus on the opposition: norm vs. provision: 
The problem of the legal norm has also been discussed in terms of 
‘legislative sentences’ which consist of the following elements: fact 
situation (…), statement of law (…) The statement of law, which 
specifies its modality, is always in the main clause (or clauses), 
whereas the elements pertaining to the fact-situation are more 
                                                
1 According to Ziembiński, functors are words or expressions which are neither sentences nor 
names, but which serve the purpose of linking expressions in more complex structures and 
expressions. 
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flexible, being formulated as adverbial modifiers in a subordinate 
‘if’ or ‘where’ clause (Myrczek 2005:XIII) 
Myrczek discerns between two elements of a norm, the fact-situation and the 
statement of law. While the former corresponds to what jurisprudence calls 
hypothesis, one may detect in the latter concept the notion of disposition 
(Nowacki, Tobor 2002: 74-81). The hypothesis, or fact situation, specifies the 
conditions under which the particular rule operates, (…) it gives conditions of 
application of a given norm, as Myrczek put it (2005:XIII). In other words, the 
hypothesis part delimitates the scope of applicability, the legally relevant factual 
situations in which a given norm should be applied. The disposition, on the other 
hand, determines the legal consequences that should be ascribed to the 
circumstances described in the hypothesis. More generally speaking, the 
disposition tells the addressees of a given norm what to do, or what not to do, if the 
factual situation described in the hypothesis occurs. The division depicted by 
Myrczek is one of the possible solutions while searching for the internal structure 
of a norm. Other alternatives are to distinguish the third element, namely a 
sanction, the consequences the addressee of the norm has to face if he or she does 
not comply. We may also differentiate between sanctioned norms - addressed to 
everybody, and sanctioning norms – whose addressees are state organs applying 
law (for instance courts), and which instruct judges or state officials what 
sanctions to apply if somebody does not conform to the sanctioned norm 
(Nowacki, Tobor 2002: 74-82).  
As linguists and theorists of legal translation, we are not as much interested in 
the distinctions offered by the theory of law as in their practical consequences in 
translation. From this point of view, we may criticize the apparent Myrczek’s 
identification of particular norm elements with certain parts of a sentence, 
understood as a purely grammatical syntactic unit (for example the conclusion that 
the statement of law, which specifies its modality, is always in the main clause, 
found in the quoted fragment). By attributing grammatical qualities within a given 
sentence to either the hypothesis or the disposition, the author seems to overlook 
the jurisprudential division between the norm and provision. While examining 
certain textual features, the author is probably entitled to such a simplification, 
Yet, speaking of grammatical structures connected with the hypothesis and 
disposition (as these are expressed in certain parts of a provision), the author 
remains on the level of provisions from which the norms are yet to be inferred, 
deduced. 
The main problem connected with such an approach is that a single provision 
of law, understood as a unit of text, may, and usually does, give rise to a number of 
norms rather than a single one. On the other hand, a single legal norm may stem 
from a number of provisions, for example certain rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution are expressed more precisely in certain subject-specific legi speciali of 
various parliamentary acts. In other words, while generally complicated, the 
relation between a norm and a provision does not boil down to the statement that 
the former is the semantic and the latter is the phonological pole of one symbolic 
structure. Norms are derivative in relation to provisions, but these two do not form 
any common symbolic structure. Norms are simply more abstract than provisions. 
In modern Western literature the tendency to search for solutions which do not 
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necessarily stem from the literal understanding of a provision are best epitomized 
by A. Barak’s concept of purposive interpretation (Barak 2005:125 ff). 
5. Relevance of norms in translation 
From the point of view of the semantic contents of the target text of translation 
and their correspondence in relation to the source language provision, the 
following observation made by Jopek-Bosiacka (2006) may shed some light on our 
distinction between the norm and provision: 
…a grasp of a legal text has to take into account the fact that legal 
interpretation consists in reproducing legal norms from legal 
provisions. Hence, from the point of view of the process of 
translation, the correct rendition of a legal text is the one that does 
not distort the contents of legal norms contained in the legal text. 
(Jopek-Bosiacka 2006:25; translated by G.P.) 
Basically, the task of legal translators is to render provisions of law, not norms, 
since translators and interpreters work on texts. However, while doing so, the 
translator should not neglect the norms potentially lurking in the provision he or 
she is working on. A particular translation is not going to be successful if the 
source and target texts give rise to blatantly different normative directives. This is 
similar to G. Jäger’s (1975:111) concepts of “communicative” and “functional 
equivalence” in the theory of translation. The former of the two preserves the 
“communicative” and the latter the “functional value” of the original text. These 
terms in turn denote respectively: the meaning intended by the author and the 
total of the potential functions of language signs in more specific contexts. 
6. An example 
In order to exemplify the above regularities, a slightly silly situation is going to be 
depicted. It is noteworthy that the difference between norms and provisions is 
most apparent in the case of ridiculous provisions of law. This particular case 
refers to a “high heel race” organized this year by a woman magazine in one of 
Poland’s biggest cities. The idea behind the event was to organize a running race 
for women who were supposed to wear high heel shoes. Broadly speaking, the 
situation narrated here was related by a user of an Internet law forum,2 a male not 
admitted to the event because of his sex. The official rules of the race, printed in 
the magazine and binding for the organizers, state as follows: 
1. Uczestniczyć w biegu może każda osoba pełnoletnia. Osoby 
niepełnoletnie mogą wziąć udział za zgodą rodziców. 
2. Liczba uczestniczek jest ograniczona. Jedynie 100 pierwszych 
kandydatek zostanie dopuszczonych do biegu. 
The contents of these two points may be rendered in English as follows:  
1. Every person of age may participate in the race. Minors may 
participate under parental consent. 
2. The number of women participating in the race is limited. Only 
the first 100 candidates shall be admitted. 
                                                
2 The thread in question may be found here: 
http://forumprawne.org/viewtopic.php?p=297534&highlight=#o297534 [data dostępu: styczeń, 
2008] 
Grzegorz Panek: Towards a Norm-Based Approach  
in Translation of Legal Provisions 
81 
 
If we are to state whether the translated text retains the contents of the original 
regulation, it should be exactly determined what norms can be deduced from both 
and checked if these norms are corresponding. According to the first article of the 
original Polish text, the first norm tells the reader that every person of age may 
participate in the race. One must conclude that the term “person” does not 
determine sex. An adult or a minor may be either female or male. As a 
consequence, everyone, regardless of their sex, may partake. 
Only the second of the two regulations directly speaks of females. However, we 
must also answer the question: in what context? Apparently, this provision does 
not stipulate that males may not run in the race. The provision of the race 
regulations we are talking about merely confines the number of female 
participants. In the light of this second point, a contrario, the number of possible 
male participants is to be considered unlimited. For the obvious gap in the 
regulation, we must logically conclude that the article does not explicitly ban men. 
Consequently, the norms we may infer from these two points provided by the 
Internet forum user, are as follows: 
1. Everyone may participate in the event, regardless of their sex. 
2. The number of female participants is limited to 100. 
3. The number of male participants is unlimited. 
If we are to apply the approach we have assumed, in order to see if the 
translation provided here is relevant and equivalent, we should check whether the 
translated provisions trigger the same norms. The first of the two points is rather 
unproblematic. The term “osoba,” defined in the Civil Code is internationally well 
enrooted in the Roman tradition, and as such has the direct English equivalent of 
person, an expression camparably neutral in terms of gender. “Osoba małoletnia,” 
analogically, has a direct equivalent, “minor.” The reader may deduce the same 
initial norm from the target text, as it also states that everybody, both men and 
women, are allowed take part in the event. The second provision is slightly more 
complex. In order to depict the phrase “uczestniczki,” the expression “women 
participating” was used. “Female participants” could unnecessarily imply the 
opposition “female-male” and suggest that the authors of these provisions had 
envisaged that there were going to be men willing to run). Naturally, the most 
obvious direct equivalent would simply be “participants” (neutral as to gender). 
However, even if “uczestnicy” are generally translated as “participants” in legal 
texts, here the well established translation schema would not render the whole 
absurdity of these two points, as the norm inferred from the second provision 
would limit the number of all participants – men included - to 100. In our 
rendition, we did what we did and the target text looks unexpectedly awkward, 
which could be even more striking if “kandydatki” were rendered as “female 
candidates,” however, on the whole, our rendition conveys and preserves the 
absurd but original normative meaning. 
7. Conclusions 
To conclude what has been said so far, we may state that equivalent translation of 
a legal provision is a rendition from which identical norms may be mentally 
inferred. Once this goal is achieved, dynamically or formally, the result is going to 
be an equivalent translation. Obviously, this type of equivalence is not ultimate but 
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only gradable. As a result of the socio-cultural differences in motivation of legal 
terms, their meaning will never be synonymous. We should bear in mind that a 
single norm may be inferred from a handful of provisions, just as a single provision 
may give rise to a number of norms. In the first case the situation of a translator is 
much more difficult, as the particular configuration of legal provisions and their 
mutual relation, which influence the construction of a given single norm, will 
always be culture- or system-specific. Hence, we may only generally try and 
approximate the ideal. The type of equivalence depicted here should be treated as a 
goal which we are trying to approach as close as possible. 
Paradoxically, one of the possible accusations against the norm-based 
approach in translation of legal provisions is that we do not only translate texts for 
texts, but also build bridges between various normative systems. One of the basic 
assumptions in the study of translation is that we are supposed to render parole, 
not langue. Still, being able to construct norms and preserve these in the target 
text requires some competence – not only in the specialized lexicons of law, but 
also directly in law - on the part of the translator. However, our goal is to handle 
the semantic redundancy of certain lexical units used in legal contexts, redundancy 
understood as the amount of linguistic signals exceeding the minimum necessary 
in order to render the message, or to put it simpler, the degree of predictability of a 
given element on the basis of overall context. (Kielar 1973:19) In the case of legal 
terminology used in a given context, it is difficult to say what is redundant, as one 
cannot expect in advance what semantic components are going to be valid and, 
most importantly, binding for the addressees of a given norm or parties of a 
contract. We cannot possibly predict the whole factual spectrum of events in which 
the norm may ensue legal consequences. The norm-based approach opens up 
space for cognitive analysis, since it is the competent interpreter’s mental semantic 
matrix, prerequisite knowledge, that determines the norm, understood as an 
output of interpretation. In order to achieve the goal of handling redundancy 
properly, we need to refer to the notion of norm. As written above, we understand 
an equivalent translation of a given legal text as a rendition from which the same 
or very similar norms may be inferred. This statement looks like a paraphrase of 
Wojtasiewicz’s 50 year old definition of translation in the legal context. 
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Znaczenie normy w procesie tłumaczenia przepisów prawnych 
W tym artykule zajmujemy się wzajemną relacją pojęć „norma” i „przepis” prawa, a także 
znaczeniem powyższego rozróżnienia w praktyce tłumaczenia tekstów prawnych. Przepis 
w teorii prawa definiuje się generalnie jako jednostkę redakcyjną tekstu, podczas gdy 
norma jest pewną wypowiedzią dyrektywną wyabstrahowaną w umyśle osoby 
interpretującej z jednego lub wielu przepisów. Każda norma wymaga wykładni przepisu, 
nie ma norm bez interpretacji tekstu prawnego. W teorii tłumaczenia przyjmujemy 
założenia wstępne Olgierda Wojtasiewicza (1957) i definicję tłumaczenia tego autora, 
według której ekwiwalentny jest przekład tekstu, który wywołuje u swoich odbiorców 
skojarzenia takie same, bądź bardzo podobne, jak tekst wyjściowy u swoich 
czytelników/słuchaczy. Adaptując definicję Wojtasiewicza dla potrzeb tłumaczenia aktów 
prawnych, twierdzimy, że ekwiwalentne jest tłumaczenie tekstu, z którego można 
wywnioskować te same lub bardzo podobne normy co z tekstu oryginalnego. Aby 
uwzględnić elementy normotwórcze w swojej pracy, tłumacz prawny powinien znać 
prawnicze dyrektywy interpretacyjne i podstawy instytucji prawnych, którymi się zajmuje. 
